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TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST
Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law
A. EMBRYO AND FETUS: CONCEPTS, IN GENERAL
Neither the federal government of the United States nor any of
its states have a specific law providing comprehensively for the pro-
tection of embryos and fetuses in all contexts. Rather the various
states extend protection to embryos and fetuses to varying degrees
and in various contexts. There is also no single legal definition of the
terms embryo and fetus used throughout the United States, though
the Supreme Court has recognized the embryo and fetus as sequen-
tial stages in the development of an unborn human.1
B. THE FETUS AS A "PERSON" AND BEGINNING OF "PERSONALITY"
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court expressly determined that:
"the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution does not include the unborn."2 The Court
also, however, recognized-and has reaffirmed even more strongly in
subsequent cases-the ability of the states to protect the interests of
the unborn.
Perhaps because we are a common law jurisdiction, the states
tend not to deal with the question of personhood or legal capacity of
the unborn comprehensively, but rather address the issue on a case
by case and issue by issue basis. 3 One provision of the civil code of
Louisiana proclaims that "natural personality commences from the
moment of live birth and terminates at death."4 while another provi-
sion states: "An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical
person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in
the womb."5 But few states make such clear statements in their law.
Rather the issue of legal status or capacity must be examined in a
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST is the Robert L. Willett Family Professor of Law, Washing-
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1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 at 159 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. at 158.
3. See, exploring the understanding of fetuses and embryos that has emerged
from this process, Kayhan Parsi, "Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal
Status of Fetuses and Embryos," 4 DePaul J. Health Care L. 703 (1999).
4. La. Civ. Code Ann. Tit. 1, § 25.
5. La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9, § 123.
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particular context. The only general statement one can make with
some certainty with respect to all states is that legal personality ex-
ists from the point of birth, though full legal capacity may not attach
until the date of majority (or even later if the person is incompetent).
Every state, however, has common or statutory law protecting the
interests of the unborn in some respects. Some, states even protect
the rights of fetuses born dead as against those who caused the
death.
C. FETUS AND MOTHER: RIGHTS IN CONFLICT; TERMINATION
OF PREGNANCY; AND LEGAL POSITION OF FATHER
. TOWARD EMBRYO AND FETUS
The Supreme Court decided in Roe v. Wade 6 that a woman has a
privacy right, protected by the United States Constitution, to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The Court also decided,
however, that this right is not absolute, but is cabined by the state's
interests in protecting the life and health of the mother and in pro-
tecting the potential life of the fetus.7 The Court, attempting to bal-
ance these interests, divided the pregnancy into trimesters, holding
that during the first trimester, a woman can decide to abort a fetus
free from state interference; after the end of the first trimester, the
state can regulate abortion to protect maternal health; and subse-
quent to the time when the fetus becomes viable (in 1973, at approxi-
mately the end of the second trimester), the state can regulate or
proscribe abortion in the interest of preserving fetal life except where
an abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.8
The basic principles of Roe v. Wade were reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court more than a dozen times in the decade following the decision,
but by the late 1980s the 7 to 2 majority that had decided the case
dwindled. 9 Roe's underlying holding was preserved, nevertheless, in
the Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey. 10 Casey, however, abandoned Roe's trimester
scheme, recognizing instead a continuing interest of the state in pre-
serving life, beginning at conception and becoming compelling at via-
bility (now pushed back by medical advances well before the end of
the second trimester).11 Under Casey, the states may regulate abor-
tions prior to viability to promote their "profound interest in potential
life" as long as they do not impose "an undue burden" on the woman's
right to choose. After viability, the state may regulate or proscribe
6. 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
7. Id. at 162-65.
8. Id.
9. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 490 U.S. 490 (1989).
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. Id. at 871-79.
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abortion, as long as the life and health of the mother are protected.12
Applying this formula, the Court upheld provisions in the challenged
Pennsylvania law that specified the information that a physician had
to give to a woman choosing an abortion, imposed a 24 hour waiting
period on abortions, and required either parental or judicial consent
for minors seeking an abortion. Casey, on the other hand, struck
down a provision requiring spousal consent for married women, hold-
ing that this provision imposed an undue burden on the right of the
woman to choose. As recently as 2000, a closely divided Supreme
Court reaffirmed Roe and Casey in Stenberg v. Carhart, 13 holding
that state prohibitions on the use of "partial birth abortions" prior to
the point of viability imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose.
Every state in the United States continues to regulate, and in
some circumstances prohibit, abortion. Seventeen states have kept
on their books laws that are unconstitutional under Roe and Casey in
the hopes that the Supreme Court will at some point reconsider these
cases. 14 Forty-one states prohibit postviability abortions, several im-
posing bans more restrictive than those permitted by Roe and
Casey.15 Every state also imposes some restrictions on previability
abortions, the most common being mandatory waiting periods, limi-
tations on pubic abortion funding, provisions that allow medical prov-
iders and institutions to refuse to perform abortions as directed by
their consciences, prohibitions against abortion counseling by public
employees or publicly-funded agencies, husband consent or notifica-
tion laws, statutes requiring insurance companies to charge higher
premiums for abortion coverage or prohibiting insurers from covering
abortions for public employees, informed consent laws, and parental
consent or notification laws for minors. 16 Some of these provisions
are unenforceable under Roe and Casey, and litigation continues as to
the constitutionality of specific prohibitions.
In the end, the availability of abortions varies greatly throughout
the United States, with the variation not wholly dependent upon the
law of the particular jurisdiction. Anti-abortion groups and individu-
als have been very effective in harassing, and in some instances ter-
rorizing, abortion clinics, and in some parts of the country virtually
no doctors remain who will perform abortions (even though federal
law prohibits intimidation of and interference with those choosing an
12. Id. at 878-79.
13. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
14. Jean Reith Schroedel, Is the Fetus a Person? A Comparison of Policies Across
the Fifty States 66 (2000).
15. Id. at 71-75.
16. Id. at 80-96.
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abortion 17). In other states, however, abortions are relatively freely
available, even late in pregnancy.
D. PROTECTION OF THE EMBRYO "IN VITRO"
In vitro fertilization is widely available in the United States, but
is not closely regulated. The 1992 federal Fertility Clinic Success
Rate and Certification Act 18 requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to develop a model program for inspection and certi-
fication of embryo labs, which is to be implemented by the states
through regulatory or accreditation programs. This model act was
released in July of 1999. The Fertility Clinic Act also requires repro-
ductive technology programs to report their success rates to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, which in turn is to publish
an annual consumer guide, first published in December of 1997 based
on 1995 data. 19 The certification standards contained in the model
act address issues such as quality assurance and control, qualifica-
tions of staff, and record maintenance. 20
Few states, however, have adopted statutes regulating in vitro
fertilization clinics or practices. Louisiana and New Hampshire go
the furthest in regulating in vitro fertilization. While Louisiana law
permits IVF, it recognizes an in vitro fertilized embryo as a juridical
person 21 separate from the clinic in which it is held, and prohibits the
destruction of in vitro fertilized embryos. 22 The New Hampshire law
also addresses eligibility for embryo implantation, regulation of in vi-
tro fertilization, and custody of the eggs. 23 In most states, however,
IVF is only regulated to the extent that all medical facilities, profes-
sionals, and procedures are regulated, and informed consent to dona-
tion or transplantation of gametes or embryos is governed by the
general common law of informed consent that covers all medical
procedures.
E. RIGHTS OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IN EMBRYOS IN VITRO
Disputes have arisen in several instances with respect to the cus-
tody or disposition of embryos or gametes originally frozen for the
purpose of subsequent conception when one party later wishes to pro-
ceed with implantation and the other has changed his or her mind
and refuses to consent. In some of these cases, the parties had earlier
entered into an agreement as to disposition of the embryos and the
17. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§263a-1 et seq.
19. Andrews & Elster, "Regulating Reproductive Technologies," 21 J. Leg. Med.
35 (2000).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(d).
21. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 9, § 124.
22. Id. at § 129.
23. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§168-B:13 through 168-B:15.
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court was asked to determine the enforceability of the agreement; in
other cases the court was asked to decide the issue in the absence of
an agreement.
2 4
In the earliest of these cases, Davis v. Davis, 25 the wife in a di-
vorce action asked the court for custody of embryos the couple had
earlier frozen in an attempt to achieve pregnancy. The husband op-
posed the implantation and asked initially to leave the embryos fro-
zen. The trial court found that the embryos were "human beings"
and awarded their custody to the wife. The case was appealed, and
by the time it reached the Tennessee Supreme Court both parties had
remarried and the wife wished to donate the embryos to an infertile
couple while the husband wanted them destroyed. The Tennessee
Supreme Court rejected the lower court's holding that the embryos
were persons, but also concluded that neither were they property.
The court held instead held that the embryos were something in be-
tween, entitled to respect but not possessing rights in themselves.
The court further held that the husband had a constitutional right to
avoid unwanted parenthood, and that this right outweighed the
wife's wish to donate the embryos.
The Court in Davis suggested that had the parties entered into a
contract with respect to the disposition of the embryos, that agree-
ment might govern subsequent disputes. 26 Later cases in fact in-
volved agreements, usually between the couple and the fertility
clinic. In Kass v. Kass 2 7 the New York Court of Appeals enforced an
agreement between a husband and wife and a fertility clinic that
should they not be able to agree as to the disposition of their embryos
at divorce, the embryos would be donated to research. The Court re-
jected the wife's arguments that her right of procreational privacy
should permit her to change her mind and seek implantation of the
embryos.
28
In Litowitz v. Litowitz,29 the Washington Supreme Court also
enforced a cryopreservation contract, interpreting it to provide that
the embryos were to be destroyed under the terms of the contract
since five years had elapsed since the creation of the embryos.
In A.Z. v. B.Z.;30 however, the Massachusetts court refused to en-
force a contract regarding the disposition of frozen embryos because
it violated the husband's right to refuse to procreate. And in J.B. v.
24. See Robertson, "Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Em-
bryos," 50 Emory L. J. 989 (2001) (discussing cases).
25. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), on reh'g in part, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. 1992).
26. 842 S.W.2d at 597.
27. 91 N.Y.2d 554, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998).
28. A Florida statute requires a contract with respect to the disposition of frozen
embryos to cover the question of disposition upon divorce, among other circumstances.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17.
29. 48 P.2d 261 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2002).
30. 421 Mass. 150, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (2000).
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M.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court held-in a situation where
there was an in vitro fertilization contract but the contract did not
clearly address the dispositional question-that the former wife of a
divorced couple who did not wish to procreate had a constitutional
right to block the wishes of the former husband to donate the eggs for
implantation to others.31 The court stated that as a general matter
contracts involving in vitro fertilization are enforceable, but that ei-
ther party has the right to change his or her mind about implantation
up to the point where the embryos are used or destroyed, with the
person objecting to procreation generally prevailing unless the party
seeking implantation would otherwise be unable to conceive. Finally,
in York v. Jones 32 the court permitted a couple to transfer a frozen
embryo from a Virginia to a California clinic, rejecting the Virginia
clinic's claim that the case was governed by the contract between the
couple and the clinic, and holding rather that the embryo was the
property of the couple and the clinic a bailee. 33
F. RESEARCH ON EMBRYOS "IN VITRO" AND "IN VIvo"
In the United States both federal and state law regulate research
involving both embryos and fetuses. Federal law prohibits the use of
federal funds for the creation of human embryos for research pur-
poses, or for funding research in which embryos are "destroyed, dis-
carded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than
that allowed for research on fetuses in utero."34 This statute, how-
ever, has no effect on privately-funded research, which is not regu-
lated by the federal government.
By one recent court, nine states ban research involving embryos
(eight through general bans on research involving human concep-
tuses), while a tenth bans research after the fourteenth day following
implantation. 35 The penalties available for violation of these prohibi-
tions can be quite high, including imprisonment in some states. In
other states, however, there is nothing to limit private research in-
volving embryos. Several state laws limiting embryo research have
31. J.B. v. M. B., 170 N.J. 9, 783 A.2d 707 (2001).
32. 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989).
33. Similarly, in Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.App.4th 836, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275
(Cal.App. 1993), the probate court determined that the decedent's frozen sperm was
property subject to the disposition of the court, and awarded it to his girl friend, whom
he had intended to impregnate with it.
34. This prohibition is not found in codified legislation, but has rather since the
late 1990s been regularly adopted as part of the bill that appropriates money for the
Department of Health and Human Services.
35. Lori Andrews, State Regulation of Embryo Stem Cell Research in National
Biotethics Advisory Commission, II Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research, Commis-
sioned Papers, A-i, at A-4 (2000).
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been found to be unconstitutional on the grounds that they were too
vague to inform researchers as to what was prohibited.36
Research involving fetuses is more closely regulated. Provisions
of the Federal Common Rule governing federally funded research in-
volving human subjects that protect pregnant women in research
also apply to fetal research (as well as to research involving in vitro
fertilization).37 Under these rules, the risk to the fetus posed by re-
search must be minimal unless the purpose of the activity is to meet
the health needs of the mother or the particular fetus, and in any
event, the risk must be the least possible consistent with achieving
the objectives of the activity.38 Researchers may play no role in any
decisions affecting the timing, method or procedures used for an abor-
tion; may not offer inducements for an abortion; and may not intro-
duce procedural changes in an abortion that might cause greater
than minimal risk to a pregnant woman or fetus.39 No federally
funded research can be done on a pregnant woman unless the pur-
pose of the research is to benefit the health of the mother; the fetus is
put only at minimal risk; the fetus is put at no greater risk than nec-
essary; and both the mother, and in most instances the father,
consent.4
0
Fetuses ex utero may not be used in federally funded research
until it is determined whether the fetus is viable unless the research
poses no added risk to the fetus and is necessary for developing im-
portant biomedical knowledge, or unless the activity is intended to
increase the likelihood of the survival of the fetus.41 Federally-
funded research is forbidden on nonviable fetuses if the research
would artificially maintain vital functions in the fetus or terminate
fetal respiration or the fetal heartbeat.42 Even if these requirements
are met, the activity must also be intended to develop important bi-
omedical knowledge not otherwise available and may only be carried
out if the mother, and usually the father, consent. 43 Federally
funded research involving dead fetuses, macerated fetal material or
cells, or tissue or organs excised from a dead fetus must be conducted
in accordance with state law.
44
36. Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61
F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), revd. on other grds., 518 U.S. 137 (1996); Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Ill. 1990), affd. Mem. 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990)
37. These regulations define fetus to mean "the product of human conception from
the time of implantation" until viability. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c).
38. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206.
39. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.206(a)(4), 46.206 (b).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.207.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(a).
42. 45 C.F.R. § 45.209(b)(1) & (2).
43. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(3) & (d).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 46.211.
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In addition to the Common Rule provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 289, pro-
hibits federal funding of research involving nonviable fetuses or fe-
tuses whose viability has not yet been determined unless the
research will enhance the health, well-being or chances of survival of
the fetus, or unless the research does not pose added risk of suffering,
injury or death to the fetus and is intended to develop important bi-
omedical knowledge not otherwise attainable.45 The statute also re-
quires that the level of research risk imposed on fetuses intended to
be aborted must not be higher than the level of risk applied to fetuses
carried to term.
4 6
Twenty-six states impose some limits on fetal research.4 7 Some
ban research on dead fetuses, more on fetuses derived from abortions.
Some state laws only apply to research on live fetuses. In some states
women or couples who donate embryos or fetuses for research are
subject to criminal sanctions. Many states also prohibit the sale of
embryos or fetuses for research. It is generally agreed that consent
should be obtained from the donor before conducting research on em-
bryos or fetuses, but form consent is often obtained by fertility clinics
for the use of left-over embryos for research without specifying the
nature of the research.
G. PRENATAL AND PREIMPLANTATION DIAGNOSTICS
Prenatal and preimplantation diagnostic testing is generally un-
regulated in the United States. As noted above, about ten states ban
embryological research.48 But six of these ten exempt preimplanta-
tion screening, while the remaining four permit preimplantation
screening if it is shown to be beneficial or without risk to the em-
bryo.4 9 Two further states prohibit research prior to an abortion or
when the embryo is intended to be aborted.50 Several of the federal
court cases that have struck down state laws prohibiting research on
embryos on constitutional grounds, however, have based their deci-
sions on the argument that the statutes, which prohibited fetal exper-
imentation while permitting diagnostic or therapeutic testing, were
unconstitutionally vague. In sum, even where embryo or fetal re-
search is limited, prenatal or preimplantation diagnostic testing is
generally permitted.
Further, a right to terminate or refuse a pregnancy based on ac-
curate genetic information is widely accepted in the United States.
As discussed below, twenty-one states now recognize suits by parents
45. 42 U.S.C. § 289g.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b).
47. See supra n. 35.
48. See Coleman, "Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis of
Laws Banning Embryological Procedures," 27 Pac. L. J. 1331, 1354 (1996).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1354-55.
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for "wrongful birth" based on negligent failure to diagnose genetic de-
fects in offspring.51 These cases generally assume, of course, that the
parents would have aborted the fetus had they been accurately ad-
vised as to its genetic condition. As such, they implicitly reject any
rights on the part of the fetus to not be aborted. Some in the United
States argue that abortion or rejection of an embryo based on the
prospect of disability is discriminatory-that it is based on a misun-
derstanding about the nature of disability and devalues persons with
disabilities. 52 On the whole, however, Americans generally seem to
believe that persons who choose to procreate should have the right to
seek accurate genetic information about their prospective children,
and to refuse to bear children who would be seriously disabled.
H. PROTECTION OF FETUS AS AN ORGAN DONOR
A federal statute imposes criminal penalties for purchasing or
selling fetal tissue, as well as for acquiring or transferring fetal tissue
for transplantation where the fetus was obtained through an induced
abortion and where the donation was made for a specified person or
for a relative of the donor, or where the donor was paid the costs asso-
ciated with the abortion. 53 The statue also imposes informed consent
requirements on the donor, researcher, and donee, and limits re-
search to therapeutic research.54
Every state in the United States has adopted the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gifts Act in either its 1968 or 1987 version, both of which in
their current form define "decedent" to include a "stillborn infant or
fetus" 55 and permit donations of fetal organs by parents. Few state
statutes expressly prohibit transplantation of fetal material. 56 Sev-
eral states prohibit transplantation of fetal material for considera-
tion, 57  or prohibit abortions for the purpose of obtaining
transplantable material. 58 However, state prohibitions on fetal re-
51. Lori Andrews, "Liability Issues in Genetics: Recent Trends," presented at
ASLME Health Law Teacher's Conference, June 9, 2000.
52. See Davis, "Genetic Dilemmas an the Child's Right to an Open Future," 28
Rutgers L. J. 549 (1997); Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, "The Disability Rights Cri-
tique of Prenatal Genetic Testing, Special Supplement," The Hastings Center Report,
Sept./Oct. 1999.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1.
55. See Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act, 1968, § 1(b); 1987, § 1(2).
56. See N.D. Cent. Code,§ 14-02.2-01 and S.D. Code § 34-23A-17 (prohibiting fetal
transplants following abortions).
57. Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-67a04 (also prohibits transplantation to relatives or speci-
fied donors or of material from aborted fetuses); Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-2-111.5;
Purdon's Pa. Stat. Tit. 18 §3216.
58. Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat. §188.031.
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search, discussed above, may limit fetal tissue transplantation in
many states.59
I. REMEDIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF EMBRYO AND FETUS
Historically, American common law courts did not permit wrong-
ful death actions for injuries suffered in utero. This was true both
because a fetus was considered a "single entity" with his or her
mother, and because of a fear of fraudulent claims. 60 Beginning in
the 1940s, American courts and state legislatures began to abandon
this position. Currently, three major approaches can be found to this
issue. First, it is clear in virtually all jurisdictions that have consid-
ered the issue that a personal injury action can be brought by a child
born alive for fetal injuries, and wrongful death actions can be
brought by the representatives of a child born alive for injuries suf-
fered by the child before birth that resulted in death after birth,
though in some jurisdictions it must be shown that the fetus was via-
ble at the time of the injury.61 About half the states also allow
wrongful death actions for fetuses that die from an injury suffered in
utero if the fetus was viable when the injury occurred. 62 Finally, a
few jurisdictions allow wrongful death actions on the part of a fetus
even if the fetus was not viable at the time of the injury.6 3 Where
wrongful death damages are recoverable, the extent of damages re-
coverable depends on the damages permitted under the state's
wrongful death statute. Courts generally permit recovery of medical
care and funeral and burial expenses, with some going further to per-
mit recovery based on the parents' loss of a potential child's society
or of the child's future earning capacity.64 Finally, a few jurisdictions
permit the mother to recover for her own sorrow, grieving and mental
anguish for the loss of an unborn child.
65
Though courts have been increasingly open to permitting civil re-
coveries for the death of unborn fetuses, courts have been less willing
to approve criminal prosecutions for murder or vehicular homicide
involving the death of a fetus, except where a state's statutory law
clearly authorizes such actions.66 When injury to a fetus caused the
death of child born alive, however, homicide prosecutions are gener-
59. See Gonzalez, "The Legitimization of Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research
Under Roe v. Wade," 34 Creighton L. Rev. 895, 904-06 (2001).
60. See Shah, "Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child: Recogni-
tion of a Fetus as Potential Life," 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 931, 934-35 (2001). The leading
case was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
61. Chase, "Liability for Prenatal Injuries," 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, §2 (1971).
62. Shah, supra n. 60, at 942-49; Shapiro, "Annotation, Right to Maintain Action
or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child," 84 A.L.R.3d 411, § 4 (1978)
63. See Shah, supra n. 60, at 949-51; Shapiro, supra n. 62, at § 5.
64. Shapiro, supra n. 62, at §§ 2,6-8.
65. Id. at §§ 9, 10.
66. See Shah, supra n. 60, at 951-63;
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ally allowed. About half the states, moreover, currently have stat-
utes criminalizing actions against a fetus either as homicide or
feticide.67 These vary as to the point in fetal development after which
causing death to a fetus becomes a crime, with some states criminal-
izing injuries causing the death of an unborn embryo or fetus from
the date of conception, others only if the injury is caused after the
point of "quickening" or viability.68 Several states also penalize ac-
tions against pregnant women that result in miscarriage or injure the
fetus.69 Legislation is currently pending in Congress that would
make causing the death of, or causing bodily injury to, a child in
utero a separate offense if the death or injury was caused while the
perpetrator was in the course of committing one of a number of desig-
nated federal offenses.
70
The question of how to respond to women who expose their fetus
to potential harm through drug abuse has proved particularly contro-
versial in the United States. The problem has received a great deal of
media coverage, and thirty-five states have adopted legislation ad-
dressing it.71 Though a few states have adopted statutes recognizing
prenatal drug abuse as prima facie evidence of child abuse or neglect,
most states have taken a more public health-oriented approach, em-
phasizing education and counseling. 72 Despite the reluctance of state
legislatures to adopt laws penalizing prenatal drug abuse, prosecu-
tors in many states have brought criminal prosecutions against pre-
natal drug abusers under the general criminal laws.7 3 The United
States Supreme Court has recently held that the practice of a state
hospital which routinely tested the urine of pregnant patients for
drugs and referred women who tested positive to the police for crimi-
nal prosecutions violated the constitutional prohibition against un-
reasonable searches.
74
American law distinguishes between wrongful birth cases (in
which the parents of a child born with serious birth anomalies claim
that they would not have chosen to conceive or would have aborted
the child had they been given sufficient information about the child's
probable condition); wrongful life cases (in which a child with serious
anomalies presents the same claim); and wrongful conception cases
(in which a healthy child's parents claim that the defendant's negli-
67. Smith, Note, "Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of Cur-
rent State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application," 41 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1845, 1851 (2000). See also, Wasserstrom, "Homicide Based on Kill-
ing of Unborn Child," 64 A.L.R.5th 671 (1998).
68. Smith, supra n. 67, at 1851-65.
69. Id. at 1865-69.
70. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R. 503.
71. Schroedel, supra n. 14, at 100-13.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 113-16.
74. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (2001).
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gence resulted in the unwanted conception of the child.)75 Wrongful
birth and conception cases have been widely accepted in the United
States. Though seven states bar wrongful birth claims by statute,
the courts of one of these states, North Carolina, have allowed a mal-
practice case based on defective genetic advising to proceed, noting
that the parents could have chosen not to conceive had they been
properly informed. 76 Only three states permit "wrongful life" cases,
while nine states bar such claims by statute. 77
Courts in wrongful birth actions generally allow damages for the
costs of the pregnancy and the extraordinary health care and educa-:
tional costs associated with the child, but commonly do not permit
recovery for the costs that would be incurred in raising a "normal"
child. 78 States are divided as to whether emotional costs associated
with the birth of a seriously ill child are recoverable. 79 Where wrong-
ful life actions are allowed, the damages allowed are similar to those
permitted in wrongful birth cases.80 Courts in wrongful conception
cases award medical expenses and lost earnings from the pregnancy,
but most courts have not awarded the costs of raising the unwanted
child, though this may be changing.8 1
J. DEVELOPING ISSUES: LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING
STEM CELL RESEARCH
One of the most contentious issues involving fetuses and em-
bryos currently being debated in the United States is whether or not
to permit stem cell research based on material derived from embryos
or fetuses.8 2 There is currently no federal statute specifically gov-
erning stem cell research, though proposed legislation is pending.
Since stem cells can be derived, however, either from human embryos
or fetal tissue, stem cell research is affected by the statutes and regu-
lations governing embryo and fetal research in general, discussed
above.
In January of 1999, the General Counsel of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) under the former Clinton ad-
75. See Barry Furrow, et al., Health Law, § 17-1 (2d ed. 2000).
76. See Andrews, supra n. 51.
77. See id.
78. See Furrow, supra n. 75, at §17-5.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
82. See National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), I Ethical Issues in
Human Stem Cell Research 29-44 (1999); "Symposium on Manufactured Humanity:
The Ethical and Legal Issues of Stem Cell Research, Bioengineering, and Human
Cloning," 65 Albany L. Rev. 687ff. (2002); Andrews, supra n. 35; Flannery & Javitt,
"Analysis of Federal Laws Pertaining to Funding of Human Pluripotent Stem Cell
Research," in National Bioethics Advisory Commission, supra n. 35, at D-1; Feiler,
"Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation and Relative Rights," 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 2435 (1998); Green, "Stopping Embryo Research," 9 Health Matrix 235 (1999).
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ministration issued a legal opinion that federal prohibitions on fund-
ing research involving human embryos do not prohibit stem cell
research since human pluripotent stem cells are not embryos.8 3 The
opinion also stated that stem cell research based on fetal tissue was
permitted if it complied with the federal provisions dealing with fetal
research, outlined above.84 A report from the National Bioethics Ad-
visory Commission basically concurred in these results.
85
In August of 2000, the National Institute of Health issued guide-
lines for federally-funded research involving human pluripotent stem
cells.8 6 . These guidelines permitted embryo-based research only
where the embryos had been created, for infertility treatment and
were not needed for this purpose. The guidelines prohibited pay-
ments or other inducements for the embryos. They required that em-
bryo donors give informed consent to the donation for research, with
the information provided to the donors meeting detailed require-
ments. The guidelines also required that the researcher proposing to
derive or use the stem cells be a different person than the physician
responsible for the fertility treatment, so as to lessen conflicts of
interest.
Under the August 2000 guidelines, research involving stem cells
derived from fetal tissue had to comply with the provisions of the
Common Rule and of the federal statutes governing fetal tissue re-
search and fetal tissue transplantation.87 The fetal tissue provisions
of the guidelines dealing with informed consent and prohibition of
purchase of fetal tissue are essentially identical to those pertaining to
embryo research.
In August of 2001, President Bush suspended the guidelines
with respect to embryonic stem cells and issued new guidelines on
the topic.8 8 Under President Bush's guidelines, federal funds may
only be used to fund research on about sixty stem cell lines that had
already been created from embryos with donor consent and without
financial incentives prior to President Bush's statement. Federal
funds cannot be used for research involving stem cells created from
embryos destroyed after President Bush's announcement.
There currently exists also a prohibition on the use of federal
funds for research involving cloning, which would affect potential
stem cell research based on cloning. Federal legislation further ban-
ning cloning research has been proposed, but not yet adopted. The
83. Medical Research: NIH Says Federal Law No Bar to Financing Stem Cell
Research, BNA's Health Care Daily Report, Jan. 27, 1999.
84. Id.
85. NBAC, supra n. 82.
86. 65 Fed. Reg. 51976 (2000).
87. 42 U.S.C. 289g-1, 42 U.S.C. 289g-2(a), and 45 CFR 46.210.
88. See, "Medical Research: President Bush Backs Federal Funding for Limited
Embryonic Stem Cell Study," BNA's Health Care Daily Report, Aug. 13, 2001.
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issue of cloning has, not surprisingly, provoked considerable aca-
demic commentary in the United States, and was the subject of an
extended study by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission.89
K. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the law of the United States with respect to em-
bryos and fetuses is far from consistent, representing the deep divi-
sion in the United States over the issue of abortion. There are some
recognizable tendencies in the law, however. Most states prohibit the
abortion of viable fetuses except under very limited circumstances,
while also allowing wrongful death actions and permitting criminal
homicide or feticide prosecutions when a third party causes the death
of the fetus. Most states, on the other hand do not permit wrongful
death recoveries or criminal homicide prosecutions against one who
causes the death of an embryo, and the states are forbidden by the
Constitution, as currently interpreted, from penalizing abortion of an
embryo. No state grants an embryo or fetus full recognition as a ju-
ridical person while in vivo, but neither does our law treat the em-
bryo or fetus simply as property.
I do not foresee the possibility of the United States achieving a
sufficient consensus as to the nature of the embryo and fetus to per-
mit universal and consistent answers to the questions raised by this
report. One recent opinion poll found that 52% of Americans agreed,
and 37% disagreed, with the result of Roe v. Wade, while 50% identi-
fied themselves as pro-choice and 42% as pro-life.90 On the other
hand, 50% believed that abortions were too easy to get in the United
States (16% "too hard"), while 42% supported new laws restricting
abortion (38% opposed).91 With this level of division, and inconsis-
tency, it is unlikely that we can hope for consistent laws the legiti-
macy of which will be widely accepted on these contentious topics in
the near future.
89. See, NBAC, Cloning Human Beings, Vol. 1, Reports and Recommendations,
Vol. 2, Commissioned Papers (1997); Greely, "Banning 'Human Cloning': A Study in
the Difficulties of Defining Science," 8 So. Cal. Interdisciplinary L. J. 131 (1998); Rob-
ertson, "Liberty, Identity and Human Cloning," 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1371 (1998).
90. Portrait of America, Opinion Poll, January 18, 2001. http://www.portraitof
america.com/html/poll-1604.html (visited July 17, 2001).
91. Id.
646 [Vol. 50
